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Abstract
This paper assesses the current state of the war prerogative, specifically focusing on deployment decisions.
It outlines the constitutional position over troop deployments, scrutinises recent reform efforts and pro-
blematises the rationale underpinning those reforms. The paper proceeds along one simple normative
claim: that against the backdrop of frequent interventions, the publication of the Iraq Inquiry and a series
of Bills that have sought to statutorise deployment decisions, less use-of-force is better than more use-of-
force, and constitutional arrangements ought to reflect this. The paper begins with an exegesis of the most
recent attempt to bring deployment decisions onto a statutory footing, focusing on: (a) the difficulties and
concomitant problems in defining ‘conflict decisions’; and (b) whether it could make deployment deci-
sions reviewable. The paper then seeks to examine the rationale for reform, arguing that the main impetus
behind the series of efforts has been to democratise the process of troop deployments when instead they
should focus on use-of-force reduction.
Keywords: Armed Forces Deployment (Royal Prerogative) Bill; royal prerogative; war prerogative; use of force; judicial review;
constitutional convention
Introduction
It must be stated from the outset that the reader may perceive there to be an enduring pacifistic sen-
timent1 running through the heart of this paper. Whether that is a reasonable interpretation or not,
this paper accepts that in an international order made of nation states, the use of force – from air
strikes, to troops on the ground and all the variants in between – is a necessary evil presumed in
the liberal order, and that such decisions are the prerogative of the state.2 This paper operates on a
very simple premise: that less use-of-force is better than more use-of-force and, as such, our consti-
tutional arrangements around troop deployments ought to reflect this. It does not require a
Herculean effort to acknowledge that less militarised states have more flourishing societies. In the
Institute for Economics and Peace’s 2015 report, Global Peace Index, it stated that ‘in societies
© The Society of Legal Scholars 2018
1Part of this sentiment stems from a scepticism of the broadening of the exceptions to the prohibitions of the use of force.
These arguments at the international law level translate to justifications at the domestic level for the use of force. One example
was the controversial deployment of the ‘revivalist theory’ that was used as a justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. See J
Woo ‘International law and the war in Iraq’ (2002) 97 American Journal of International Law 63. International lawyers have
also engaged with the claim that interpretations of the exceptions to the general proscription of the use of force are effectively
covers for colonial endeavours, and that there are structural continuities between modern day use of force and force previ-
ously justified under imperial pursuits. See also N Berman ‘In the wake of empire’ (1999) 14 American University
International Law Review 1521; A Orford Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in
International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2009) 18; G Gozzi ‘The “discourse” of international law and humanitarian intervention’
(2017) 30(2) Ratio Juris 186.
2Unless, of course, such a configuration of the liberal international order is transformed. For a critique of liberal world
order, see P Mishra Age of Anger: A History of the Present (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017). For a defence of
the liberal world order, see J Ikenberry ‘The end of liberal international order?’ (2018) 94(1) International Affairs 7.
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where Positive Peace is stronger, development goals are more likely to be achieved. These societies are
more resilient when faced with crisis and have fewer grievances’ and have ‘better performance on well-
being measures, gender equality and better performance on ecological measures’.3 The effects of the
use of force, not only on the recipient, as Libya most recently has illustrated,4 but also on the alleged
aggressor, are clear. The economic impacts are apparent, as are the national security threats it may
invite as a result. Of course, a state’s use-of-force arrangements are only one part in the complex
machinery of state and society and the determination of whether it is peaceful or not. However, it
can be claimed, without any quantum leap, that particular constitutional arrangements governing
the use of force and peaceful societies can be mutually reinforcing.
Liberal democratic polities that have inherited the legacies of social contract theory have always
claimed that the use of force is a legitimate policy tool in upholding the state’s obligation to protect
its citizens.5 By extension, such an obligation within the liberal paradigm demands the need for oper-
ational efficacy and flexibility in military matters. The UK’s ‘war prerogative’6 is considered one of its
most significant executive powers. A specific part of this, deployment decisions, is considered a matter
of ‘high policy’7 and, as such, a ‘forbidden’ area for common law review,8 not legally requiring any
approval from Parliament in its engagement. Since the controversial First Gulf War, a series of legis-
lative proposals (most recently the current Private Members Armed Forces Deployment (Royal
Prerogative) Bill 2016–2017) and governmental and Parliamentary committee reports have sought
to challenge the previous executive monopoly over deployment decisions. Indeed, since the turn of
the millennium, there has been a greater desire to ‘tame the prerogative’.9 Coupled with the airstrikes
in Libya in 2011,10 ongoing airstrikes in Iraq and Syria and the recent publication of the Chilcot
Inquiry (though it was silent on the jus ad bellum-in bello of the 2003 Iraq invasion), deployment deci-
sions continue to invite much scholarly, political and public attention.
The pressing issue, for matters of such constitutional importance, ought to be what underpins these
reform efforts. Some may tentatively claim that the frequency of military deployments is cause for con-
cern, and that use-of-force reduction ought to formulate the end to which reform is directed. Others
will take the democrats’ approach, arguing that decisions of such gravity necessarily require scrutiny
and legitimacy of the house (though this is not to suggest that Parliamentarians cannot be both pacif-
ists and democrats). The paper therefore, seeks to determine what basis – democratisation or
use-of-force reduction – informs the reform efforts and critically examine those impulses.
This paper begins with outlining the current constitutional configuration of the war prerogative,
specifically focusing upon deployment decisions. Part of this analysis will discuss the strength of
Parliamentary intervention in deployment decisions and detail its role, followed by an analysis of
the most recent Parliamentary effort to statutorise deployment decisions, the Armed Forces
Deployment (Royal Prerogative) Bill 2016–2017. The Lords’ debate around the recent Private
Members Bill highlighted, among others, the following anxieties with statutorising the power: (a)
the challenges with defining combat or ‘conflict decisions’; and (b) the prospective justiciability of
such a power, all of which would compromise the state’s apparent peremptory obligation to protect
3Institute for Economics and Peace Global Peace Index: Measuring Peace, its Causes and its Economic Values (2015) p 3.
4Foreign Affairs Committee Libya: Examination of Intervention and Collapse and the UK’s Future Policy Options (HC
2016–17).
5W Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England, in Four Books, vol 1 (E Christian (ed), 13th edn, Strahan 1800) 252;
for an alternative view which examines the state’s use of force (or violence more generally) in the production of the homo
sacer (the ‘bare life’) see R Van Munster ‘The war on terrorism: when the exception becomes the rule’ (2004) 17(2)
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 141.
6China Navigation v AG [1932] 2 KB 197. I will focus on one aspect of the ‘war prerogative’, specifically the deployment of
troops abroad. For a discussion on the scope of the war prerogative see also R Joseph The War Prerogative: History, Reform
and Constitutional Design (Oxford: OUP, 2013).
7R (on the application of Gentle) v The Prime Minister [2006] UKHL 20.
8CND v Prime Minister of the United Kingdom [2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin).
9See Public Administration Select Committee Taming the Prerogative: Strengthening Ministerial Accountability (HC 2003–04).
10See Foreign Affairs Committee, above n 4.
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its citizens. The analysis of the Bill, which shares many similarities with a long line of similar Bills, will
proceed on the basis of whether such a Bill addresses these two key anxieties. As for the definitional
challenges, it will pay particular attention to the potential indeterminacy of key terms in the Bill such
as ‘conflict decisions’, ‘special conditions’ and ‘emergency conditions’, the latter two identifying excep-
tions to the general rule which would otherwise require Parliamentary authorisation before engaging
military forces. On the judicial review of deployment decisions, the paper will focus on how statutor-
ising the prerogative may, if at all, affect the justiciability of the prerogative power, tentatively arguing
that the Bill may permit the High Court to venture into areas typically considered ‘no-go’ areas of
exclusive executive jurisdiction.
The paper then turns to problematising the underlying rationale for the reform efforts of deploy-
ment decisions. It argues that democratisation of deployment decisions, as the primary impulse and
aim for statutorising the prerogative, is partially misplaced. The main basis of this claim is that by mak-
ing Parliament involved in deployment decisions, though fully accepting that subjecting deployment
decisions to parliamentary scrutiny would be a positive development, may tend toward providing a
legitimacy for deployment decisions that are not necessarily legal under UN Charter-based justifications
under international law – a position advanced by Murray and O’Donoghue.11 In keeping with the
paper’s central thesis, that less use-of-force is better than more use-of-force, this section instead argues
therefore, that reform efforts ought to be predicated on use-of-force reduction as the end.
I. The current state of the ‘war prerogative’
The ‘war prerogative’ is understood to mean ‘the powers, sourced in the prerogative, to declare war and
to deploy the armed forces’.12 Typically, as with most of the monarch’s prerogative powers in contem-
porary constitutionalism, these are exercised on her behalf by her government ministers.
The history of parliamentary involvement in the exercise of the war prerogative was largely consist-
ent for the 400 years prior to the 1950s. Parliament’s involvement had been either to offer support or
advice, to be kept informed and gauge public support, or to exercise its power to raise taxes for war
efforts.13 However, there was no sense in which Parliament approved deployment decisions and
indeed, in the exercise of these functions, they were often informed ex post factum. Parliamentary
interventions began to change after the end of the Second World War. In 1950, after it had begun,
Clement Atlee held a Commons vote over the Korean war.14 After the UK had taken military action
over Egypt in 1956 following President Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal, a motion was put to
the Commons until the House was then adjourned. Numerous military interventions of varying levels
of conflict, from the Falklands in 1982, Iraq in 1991 and 1998, Kosovo in 1999, Sierra Leone in 2000
and Afghanistan in 2001 did not compel the government to invite the legislature to vote directly on
military deployments. Though a specific Bill was introduced following the four-day bombing cam-
paign of Iraq in 1998,15 the introduction of a non-binding parliamentary vote on the Iraq invasion
in 2003 ended a 53-year hiatus of Parliament’s role in deployment decisions and, at that point,
only the second time in the UK’s constitutional history16 where the Commons had voted on war –
and the first where the vote was held before the deployment.
11C Murray and A O’Donoghue ‘Towards unilateralism? House of Commons oversight of the use of force’ (2016) 65(2)
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 305.
12Joseph, above n 6, p 2.
13Joseph, above n 6, pp 96–106.
14Hansard HC Deb, vol 477, col 485, 5 July 1950.
15The Bill was defeated prior to its second reading as it sought to affect the prerogative: Military Action against Iraq
(Parliamentary Approval) Bill 1999, available at https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmbills/035/
1999035.htm.
16There was a period from 1642–1649 in which the powers of government, including the war prerogative, were assumed by
the Parliament: Joseph, above n 6, pp 45–47.
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The complexion of the war prerogative therefore, has critically changed since 2003,17 with the emer-
gence of a new convention to consult the Commons. The convention was set18 when Tony Blair reluc-
tantly invited Parliament to vote on whether or not to invade Iraq (the third bombing campaign in less
than 13 years). This precedent was then applied19 in 2011 when British forces (as part of NATO) estab-
lished a no-fly zone over Libya – though again, troops had been deployed two days before a Parliamentary
vote took place – and was finally established20 when Parliament refused to permit air strikes in Syria in
2013 following claims that the Assad regime had used chemical weapons on US and UK-backed rebels.
Importantly, the then Prime Minister David Cameron honoured Parliament’s vote despite not being
legally obliged to do so. Subsequent votes to conduct airstrikes in Iraq in 2014 on invitation by the
Iraqi government, and in Syria in 2015, have arguably settled the convention. Despite the genesis of
Parliament’s consultative role in 2003, only from 2013 did a consistent convention materialise (especially
as military deployments had occurred in Mali in 2013, and in Afghanistan from 2001).
The UK’s current constitutional position over deployment decisions, therefore, seeks approval from
the House of Commons pertaining to the possibility of premeditated action in which military forces
are to be deployed in combat operations. Presumably, initially non-combative deployments which then
turn combative would warrant subsequent parliamentary approval. Retrospective approval would only
be sought in emergency situations (ie to protect critical national interests, prevent humanitarian catas-
trophe or self-defence).21 The current constitutional position has also been described negatively by
what it cannot do. For example, parliamentary consultation and approval is not a legal requirement,
and the Commons also lack the power of initiative over military deployment decisions. Further, there
are no standards for the information Parliament would be privy to in such discussions.22 Despite this,
however, the strength of the convention has been enough for some commentators to suggest that
‘Parliament now decides when Britain goes to war’.23
The strength of the convention has also been recognised by its inclusion in the Cabinet Manual,
which now states that ‘the Government acknowledged that a convention had developed in Parliament
that before troops were committed, the House of Commons should have an opportunity to debate
the matter and said that it proposed to observe that convention except where there was an emergency
and such action would not be appropriate’.24 However, the consultative role of the Commons has found
varying levels of favour25 and as recently as April 2016, the former Defence Secretary Michael Fallon
voiced clear rejection of statutorising deployment decisions, raising concerns that such action would
compromise its expediency, efficiency and potentially make it amenable to review by the High Court.26
However, in April 2017, the Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, informed BBC Radio 4 of the pos-
sibility of UK military action against Syrian Government forces if the US invited the UK’s support, and
that whether the government could take such action without seeking parliamentary approval, needed
to be tested.27 On 14 April 2018, following a chemical weapons attack on Douma a week earlier, the
17For a detailed outline of legislative history, parliamentary and government reports on the war prerogative, see P Lagassé
‘Parliament and the war prerogative in the United Kingdom and Canada: explaining variations in institutional change and
legislative control’ (2017) 70 Parliamentary Affairs 285.
18J Strong ‘Why parliament now decides on war: tracing the growth of the parliamentary prerogative through Syria, Libya
and Iraq’ (2015) 17(4) The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 608; Murray and O’Donoghue contest that
the Commons vote on Iraq created a convention: see Murray and O’Donoghue, above n 11, at 325.
19Strong, above n 18, at 612.
20Strong, above n 18, at 614.
21C Mills ‘Parliamentary approval for military action’ (Briefing Paper, 7166) (2015) 32–33.
22J Strong ‘Interpreting the Syria vote: parliament and British foreign policy’ (2015) 91(5) International Affairs 1124.
23Strong, above n 18, at 605.
24Cabinet Office The Cabinet Manual (London: 1st edn, 2011) p 44.
25For a detailed outline of parliamentary and government reports on the war prerogative see also Lagassé, above n 17, at
285–290.
26Hansard HC Deb, vol 608, col 11, 18 April 2016.
27J Landale ‘Johnson: Difficult to say “no” to Syria strike’ (BBC News, 27 May 2017), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-politics-39730685 (last accessed 27 May 2017).
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UK Government launched air strikes on Syrian Government targets in order to ‘alleviate the extreme
humanitarian suffering of the Syrian people’.28 Though many commentators claimed this was illegal
under international law29, this was entirely lawful under UK constitutional law. Thus, despite the
incremental development of a seemingly strong convention of general parliamentary deference, the
2018 strikes substantially undermined it.30
II. An exegesis of the Armed Forces Deployment Bill 2016–2017
Despite the emergence of a convention, though with increasingly growing exceptions, that politically
mandates parliamentary authorisation, the power to deploy troops is still exclusively within the gov-
ernment’s jurisdiction – particularly as the 2018 strikes illustrate. The convention neither imposes a
legal obligation on the government in its deployment decision, nor are such decisions reviewable in
the High Court. Despite the to-ing and fro-ing31 of the Lords Constitutional Committee and former
PMs and senior ministers,32 calls for a Bill to place the war prerogative on statutory footing have been
frequent. Indeed, from 1999–201633 there have been eight Private Members Bills that have attempted
to place deployment decisions on a statutory footing. By and large, all the Bills share a common object-
ive to statutorise Parliament’s role in deployment decisions. The few differences are largely cosmetic,
differing primarily in nomenclature, whether approval is sought from both Houses or one, how the
exceptions to parliamentary approval are framed (‘urgency’, ‘security’, ‘emergency’), and the time-
sensitive nature of retrospective approval. An exegesis of the most recent Bill therefore, can be similarly
levelled at the previous reform Bills; and though the recent 2016–2017 Bill made no further progress as
Parliament was prorogued on 3 May 2017, it is reasonable to suggest that future Bills are likely to fol-
low a similar trajectory.
The most recent of these attempts to reform the war prerogative power has been The Armed Forces
Deployment Bill 2016–2017, introduced by the Liberal Democrat peer, Baroness Falkner of
Margravine in May 2016. Like its predecessors, the Bill sought to place the current prerogative
power to deploy troops in military conflict on a statutory footing. Positioning the prerogative
2828 Policy Paper Syria Action – UK Government Legal Position (14 April 2018), available at https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/publications/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position (last accessed 10
July 2018).
2929 D Akande The Legality of the UK's Air Strikes on the Assad Government in Syria (16 April 2018), available at https://
d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/campaigncountdown/pages/2243/attachments/original/1523875290/Akande_Opinion_UK_
Government%27s_Legal_Position_on_Syria_Strike_April_2018.pdf?1523875290 (last accessed 10 July 2018).
30Tanzil Chowdhury How the recent strikes on Syria undermine UK constitutional controls on military action (The Law of
Nations Blog, 23 April 2018) <https://lawofnationsblog.com/2018/04/23/recent-strikes-syria-undermine-uk-constitutional-
controls-military-action/> (last accessed 23 April 2018); Victoria Fikfak & Hayley Hooper Whither the War Powers
Convention? What Next for Parliamentary Control of Armed Conflict After Syria (UK Constitutional Law Blog, 20 April
2018) <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2018/04/20/veronika-fikfak-and-hayley-j-hooper-whither-the-war-powers-conven-
tion-what-next-for-parliamentary-control-of-armed-conflict-after-syria/> (last accessed 20 April 2018)).
31House of Lords Select Constitution Committee, Constitutional arrangements for the use of armed force (HL 2013–14);
House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Waging War: Parliament’s role and responsibility (HL 2005–06).
32Strong, above n 18, at 611.
33Military Action against Iraq (Parliamentary Approval) Bill 1999, available at https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm199899/cmbills/035/1999035.htm; three Private Members Bills from the Commons: Armed Forces (Parliamentary
Approval for Participation in Armed Conflict) Bill 2004–2005, Armed Forces (Parliamentary Approval for Participation
in Armed Conflict) Bill 2005–2006, available at https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/016/06016.i-
i.html, Waging War (Parliament’s Role and Responsibility) Bill 2006–2007, available at https://www.publications.parlia-
ment.uk/pa/cm200607/cmbills/034/2007034.pdf, Constitutional Reform (Prerogative Powers and Civil Service etc.) Bill
2005–2006, available at https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/222/2006222.pdf; and three further
Lords Bills, Armed Forces Deployment (Royal Prerogative) Bill 2014–2015, available at https://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/bills/lbill/2014-2015/0017/15017.pdf, Armed Forces Deployment (Royal Prerogative) Bill 2015–2016, available at
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2015-2016/0034/16034.pdf and Armed Forces Deployment (Royal
Prerogative) Bill 2016–2017 , available at https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2016-2017/0010/17010.pdf.
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power on a statutory footing would thus engage the De Keyser principle,34 displacing the executive’s
exclusive jurisdiction to deploy troops. In the Lords debate on the Bill, the key driver for reform, as
well as addressing concerns about the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War,35 was to ‘strengthen our democ-
racy by codifying the power of the Prime Minister’.36 It appears, therefore, that democratisation was
the explicit basis for reform, with use-of-force-reduction, a secondary consideration.
The Bill37 consisted of five short clauses, the first of which referred to the requirement for parlia-
mentary approval (specifically the Commons) for troop deployments38 for the use of force so long as:
(a) it was outside the UK; and (b) such deployment would be regulated by the law of armed conflict –
this is what the Bill referred to as a ‘conflict decision’. The second clause described the ‘process of
approval’ which would have obligated the Prime Minister to present a report (hereafter ‘deployment
report’) outlining the ‘objectives, locations and legal matters’, though the details of this would have
been contingent on the circumstances. Thus, certain omissions in the deployment report could be war-
ranted for strategic or security reasons. A simple majority vote by the Commons to approve the con-
tent of the PM’s report would have authorised the use of force, though the Commons would also have
been entitled to consult the Lords.
Clause 3 was arguably the most significant, in that it identified exceptions to seeking Commons
approval. The general requirement of Commons authorisation could be circumvented if either an
‘emergency condition’ or a ‘security condition’ obtained. An emergency condition referred to a con-
flict decision that was ‘necessary for dealing with an emergency’ in which the imminent nature of it
would render Parliamentary approval inappropriate. The security condition described a conflict situ-
ation in which ‘public disclosure of information about the conflict decision could prejudice … the
effectiveness of activities which result from the decision or with which the decision is otherwise con-
nected’ or endanger the security or safety of UK forces, allied forces or those assisting allied forces.
Importantly, the Prime Minister retained the exclusive power to determine whether or not to invoke
either of these exceptions, though the Bill recommended that she or he consulted appropriate commit-
tees before doing do.
If either the emergency or security condition were to have been invoked, the Prime Minister would
have been required to ‘inform the chair of any committee the PM thinks appropriate’ and to publish a
report (hereafter ‘emergency condition report’ or a ‘security condition report’) citing why such an
invocation had been made, with information about the conflict decision (‘objectives, location and
legal matters’ as in clause 2 above). A caveat, however, would have been reserved for a ‘security con-
dition report’, if the Prime Minister felt that the same circumstances continued to exist which war-
ranted the initial invocation of the security condition, such that a report would compromise
national security. Under other circumstances, however, (ie if it was an emergency condition or if
the circumstances had since changed) a report would have to have been presented to the
Commons within 30 days of when the conflict decision was made. Clauses 4 and 5 respectively
exempted Common’s approval for Special Forces (or assistance to Special Forces) and stipulated
that the Bill was to apply to all of the UK.
The Bill aimed to provide ‘greater deliberation by all’, whilst also addressing the apprehensions that
opponents and sceptics had, including the then Defence Secretary Michael Fallon, with statutorising
the prerogative. Indeed, while Baroness Margravine stated that ‘the country expects the House of
Commons, their representatives, to be the place where the buck stops, not a single powerful individual,
who himself was never held accountable for his judgment’,39 she accepted that defining combat
34[1920] AC 508; for a more recent restatement of this, see also R (Munir and Another) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2012] UKSC 32.
35Hansard HL Deb, vol 773, col 2257, 8 July 2016.
36Hansard HL Deb, vol 773, col 2272, 8 July 2016.
37Armed Forces Deployment (Royal Prerogative) Bill [HL] 2016–17 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/
2016-2017/0010/17010.pdf>.
38Defined in the Armed Forces Act 2006, s 374.
39Hansard HL Deb, vol 773, col 2275, 8 July 2016.
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decisions (hereafter ‘conflict decisions’) and the potential justiciability of decisions were legitimate
anxieties that politicians would have with the Bill. The paper now proceeds to ascertain whether
these anxieties would have been adequately addressed.
(a) Defining ‘conflict decisions, security and emergency conditions’
Determining what constitutes a ‘conflict’ for the purposes of this Bill is problematic, and can perhaps
draw parallels with international law’s difficulties with defining war.40 The term’s obscurantism had
also been acknowledged by Parliament. A recent Common’s briefing paper discussing Parliament’s
role in military action stated that ‘the spectrum of potential military operations is vast’,41 a view shared
by the Joint Committee which was put together to draft a resolution on deployment decisions. Writing
in response to an MOJ White Paper, the Joint Committee also accepted the difficulties in defining a
‘conflict decision’,42 stating that recourse to international law fared no better.43 The author of the Bill,
however, did not appear to share these definitional concerns about how conflict decisions would be
interpreted by judges, instead placing her faith in intuitive understandings of the word and analogising
this with legal definitions of similarly contestable legal terms such as ‘terrorism’.44
The Bill was also silent on the deployment of troops in non-combat roles. In 2001 for example,
Parliament was not consulted on the expansion of UK military operations to Helmand province in
Afghanistan, where troops had initially been deployed in a post bellum reconstructive capacity.
Similarly, in 2013, British troops were deployed in a non-offensive capacity to train local personnel
in Mali, though this later expanded to providing surveillance aircraft.45 Both decisions took place with-
out any parliamentary debate. It would appear from the now defunct Bill that this type of deployment
would not have required Commons approval, as such deployment would not have fallen under the law
of armed conflict and would not therefore have constituted a conflict decision for the purposes of the
Bill (though Hansard reveals the anxieties provoked by such types of deployment and the absence of
Commons intervention in such a situation).46 Approval for non-combative deployments could have
turned on whether the ‘conflict decision’ would be interpreted broadly to cover either of the
Afghanistan or Mali deployments (assuming neither the security nor the emergency conditions
were engaged), but the title of clause 1 of the Bill, ‘Pre-deployment approval’ would appear to suggest,
for the lexically pedantic, that already-deployed troops were not covered.
In addition to the challenges with defining ‘conflict decisions’, there was the more prescient issue of
examining when the ‘security and emergency conditions’ obtained – the would-be exceptions to par-
liamentary approval. Like the potential plasticity of ‘conflict decisions’, there may also have been legit-
imate anxieties about the readiness of the Prime Minister to engage either of the security or emergency
exceptions. Giving the Prime Minister exclusive power to engage either of these exceptions implied
executive innocence:47 ‘there is always a danger that, by its very nature, those concerned with national
security may bring forth measures that are not objectively justified’.48 If, at its heart, the Bill was an
attempt to strengthen parliamentary democracy, the Prime Ministerial exceptions may in fact have
rendered the rule the exception. Lord Touhig, in supporting the Bill and criticising the reluctance
to put the prerogative on legislative footing, stated that:
40C Greenwood ‘The concept of war in modern international law’ (1987) 36 ICLQ 283. See also P Rowe Legal
Accountability and Britain’s War 2000–2015 (London: Routledge, 2016) p 3.
41Mills, above n 21, at 4.
42Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill Volume 1 (HC 2007–08).
43Mills, above n 21, at 39–40.
44See A Greene ‘The quest for a satisfactory definition of terrorism: R v Gul’ (2014) 77(5) Modern Law Review 780; C
Gearty ‘Terrorism and morality’ (2003) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 377.
45MOD Press Release, 25 January 2013.
46Hansard HL Deb, vol 773, col 2258, 8 July 2016.
47R v Governor of Wormwood Scrubs Prison [1920] 2 KB 305.
48A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56.
Legal Studies 7
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
On these benches, we recognise that there are occasions when to protect the safety of our forces
and for reasons of national security it would not be right to come to Parliament, but our worry is
that this is now becoming the rule, not the exception. That is why we need a Bill such as this. In a
statement published in December, I think, last year, the Ministry of Defence told us that there
were 147 of our troops in embedded forces in various parts of the world – the large majority
of them, 94, in coalition HQs. We do not even know where they are.49
The same could be said of the proposed legislation. In fact, the Bill appeared to go beyond the current
convention by ascribing additional exceptions to the current arrangement, not just on emergency
grounds but on security ones too. Notably, Baroness Margravine suggested that the failed vote on mili-
tary action in Syria in 2013 could have been authorised under the emergency condition of the new
Bill.50 Indeed, it has been the case that ‘“critical national interests” or “national security” for the pur-
poses of the emergency condition clause, have been broadly interpreted’.51
The ‘emergency condition’ exception could have swallowed the general rule to consult Parliament in
other ways too. The exception provision was described as a situation which would not allow for ‘suffi-
cient time’ for Commons approval. One situation this could have referred to is anticipatory self-defence.
Anticipatory self-defence has its basis in customary international law,52 though its frequent condemna-
tion suggests the weakness of the doctrine.53 It claims that a state need not wait for an armed attack to
occur before it can use necessary and proportionate force. However, anticipatory self-defence has many
detractors, with claims that it dresses up illegal use of force in a ‘veneer of legality’54 and seeks to under-
mine the general prohibition on the use of force under the UN Charter and the Charter-based justifica-
tions. In spite of this, the current UK Attorney General55 has firmly placed the UK in support of this
approach. The overall effect of the ‘emergency condition’, therefore, could be to provide robust parlia-
mentary legitimacy (rather than legality)56 for a controversial doctrine which could in fact result in the
overall increase of the use of force. As with anticipatory self-defence, similar arguments as to the legit-
imation of conflicts with tenuous or no legal basis under international law – such as the responsibility to
protect doctrine and humanitarian intervention57 – could function as potential invocations under the
emergency condition. These doctrines may shift the normative basis of justifying military interventions
from a legal bases (tentative or otherwise) to emphasising a decision’s ‘robust democratic legitimacy’.
Of course, these arguments as to the indeterminacy of key terms is only a problem for MPs that
seek to normalise the scrutiny and approval of troop deployments to Parliament. For the government,
it could be said that, to a certain degree, it would have had the same effect as the current arrangement,
in allowing them to exercise their exclusive jurisdiction over troop deployments through the security
and emergency exceptions.
(b) Common law review of troop deployment
If the Bill were to have passed, a pressing question would be whether it would have made deployment
decisions subject to review by the UK High Court. This would appear prima facie to be the case, as the
Bill would have provided a legal yardstick against which to scrutinise deployment decisions.
49Hansard HL Deb, vol 773, col 2273, 8 July 2016.
50Hansard HL Deb, vol 773, col 2261, 8 July 2016.
51Mills, above n 21, at 4.
52The basis for this was the Caroline Incident.
53C Gray International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford: OUP, 2008) p 121.
54Ibid, pp 160–166.
55J Wright ‘Attorney general’s speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (Institute for Strategic Studies,
London 11 January 2017), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/attorney-generals-speech-at-the-inter-
national-institute-for-strategic-studies (last accessed 28 June 2018).
56Murray and O’Donoghue, above n 11.
57Murray and O’Donoghue, above n 11, at 315–320.
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As it currently stands, deployment decisions are not justiciable and thus amenable for judicial
review.58 One can take the determination of justiciability59 in UK common law review as primarily
being based on: (a) the institutional competence and legitimacy of the courts to review a decision;
(b) the courts’ general deference to the executive on issues of national security; and (c) general judicial
reticence over ‘polycentric matters’. Rather than adopting a rigid approach on determining justiciabil-
ity, the courts have instead opted for a pragmatic one, on the basis of subject matter and suitability in
each particular case.60 Opponents of reviewing deployment decisions would, therefore, refer to the
institutional limitations of the administrative court coupled with judicial deference over national
security issues, as well as the courts’ apparent aversion to polycentric issues, in maintaining the veil
of non-justiciability over deployment decisions. Each of these three limitations is now addressed.
On the question of the High Court’s institutional competence to review the war prerogative, ‘the
courts have tended to limit their consideration of its existence and scope to a broad assertion of
the Crown’s undoubted and exclusive prerogative to declare war and deploy the armed forces. They
have not considered in depth or detail its precise existence or scope, as these have been taken as axio-
matic, and matters over which the courts should properly defer to the Crown’.61 The court’s ‘inepti-
tude’ was clearly asserted in CND v Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, when Richard J stated that
‘it is unthinkable that the national courts would entertain a challenge to a Government decision to
declare war or to authorise the use of armed force against a third country … the nature and subject
matter of such a decision require it to be treated as an indivisible whole rather than breaking it down
into legal, political and military and other components’.62 Further, Lord Bingham in R v Jones
(Margaret) stated that ‘the courts will be very slow to review the exercise of prerogative powers in rela-
tion to the conduct of foreign affairs and the deployment of armed services’.63 However, in 2013, the
Supreme Court in Smith v Ministry of Defence64 held that certain decisions of service personnel gave
rise to negligence and breaches of human rights.
On the issue of judicial deference to the executive, especially over issues of national security – the
so-called ‘national security trump’65 – the courts have generally been reluctant to exercise their super-
visory jurisdiction. Further, strict evidential requirements in judicial procedure may render certain
types of sources inadmissible in such cases.66 This deference, however, has softened with Bancoult67
and more vociferously in Rehman,68 where Lord Steyn stated that national security issues would
not automatically fall beyond the scope of High Court review.
On the question of UK public law’s apparent reluctance to adjudicate over matters which are ‘poly-
centric’, this is also contested. Polycentric issues are described as matters that comprise a large web of
interdependent relationships, such that a change to one factor produces an incalculable series of
changes to other factors.69 Lord Diplock’s speech in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for
the Civil Service provides an erudite description:
Such decisions will generally involve the application of government policy. The reasons for the
decision-maker taking one course rather than another do not normally involve questions to
which, if disputed, the judicial process is adapted to provide the right answer, by which I
58Iraqi Civilian Litigation v Ministry of Defence [2017] EWHC 3289 (QB) at [60].
59See also Rahmatullah (No 2) v Ministry of Defence and Another; Mohammed and Others v Ministry of Defence and
Another [2017] UKSC 1 at [8].
60R (on the application of Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1698.
61Joseph, above n 6, p 111.
62[2002] EWHC 2777 (Admin) at [60].
63[2006] UKHL 16 at [30].
64[2013] UKSC 41.
65Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v Minister for Civil Service [1983] UKHL 6.
66Joseph, above n 6, pp 139–142.
67R (on the application of Bancoult (No 2)) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61.
68Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2001] UKHL 47.
69L Fuller ‘The forms and limits of adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 353.
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mean that the kind of evidence that is admissible under judicial procedures and the way in which
it has to be adduced tend to exclude from the attention of the court competing policy considera-
tions which, if the executive discretion is to be wisely exercised, need to be weighed against one
another – a balancing exercise which judges by their upbringing and their experience are ill-
qualified to perform.70
However, it has elsewhere been forcefully argued that polycentricity is pervasive in public law litiga-
tion,71 and so claims that the presence of polycentricity somehow precludes judicial scrutiny are no
longer tenable. Responding to each of these three apparent limitations, it is not beyond the realms
of possibility to anticipate changes, in the near future, in which these barriers to review of deployment
decisions could gradually be curtailed.
Notably, the Bill contained no ouster clauses which precluded review, even in instances where the
Prime Minister could have invoked the emergency or security conditions. It is argued that such a Bill
would have likely perforated the seemingly impermeable membrane around the non-justiciability of
deployment decisions, not just because of the incremental loosening of three apparent limitations
mentioned above, but also because it would appear to have provided an objective yardstick for scru-
tiny. It is possible that the Bill would have subjected deployment decisions to both procedural require-
ments but also substantive grounds of review.72
It is important to recall from the GCHQ73 case that it is not the source of the power that determines
whether it is amenable to review. Therefore, that the power would have been statutorised would not
have been the reason for its reviewability. However, the codification of the power in legislation does
provide a potentially clearer standard by which to scrutinise deployment decisions and may challenge
judicial adherence to the abovementioned limitations. It is also argued that the Bill established grounds
of review that the drafter may not have anticipated.
Procedurally, there are several aspects of a deployment decision that one can speculate would have
been reviewable if the Bill had passed. The ‘deployment report’, for example, was meant to have pro-
vided reasons for the Prime Minister’s decision to commit troops aboard. The absence of such reasons
in the report, therefore, could have given rise to a lack of procedural fairness. The common law
requirement for providing reasons is only necessary if the decision appears to be ‘aberrant’74 – and
is weakened with administrative decisions75 (such as this one) – this Bill would therefore have pro-
vided a statutory-based obligation to provide reasons. Further, as the Bill identified the Prime
Minister as having the duty to present the deployment report to Parliament and alert them to the
engagement of either of the emergency or security conditions (and a subsequent report, if necessary),
it would have placed the common law principle of non-delegation76 on statutory footing. This would
have obligated her or him to present the report (rather than her or his defence secretary or Attorney
General, for example). Further, if the Prime Minister were to ignore the Parliament’s disapproval of
military action outside of the security or emergency exceptions, this would clearly be ultra vires.
Taking 2013 as an example, had the Bill have been in force then and the Prime Minister ignored
the Commons vote not to intervene in Syria, this would have been actionable.
Substantively, the Bill could have ventured into previously unchartered terrain. If the Prime
Minister had too readily engaged the emergency condition when a threat to the UK was in fact not
70Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v Minister for Civil Service, above n 65, at [411].
71J King ‘The pervasiveness of polycentricty’ (2008) Public Law 101.
72Rosara Joseph speculates as to the practicability of reviewing the power and the probability of each of the potential
grounds of review, though this was based on the treatment of deployment decisions being justiciable rather than on the
power being statutorised; see also Joseph, above n 6, pp 144–159.
73Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v Minister for Civil Service, above n 65.
74R v Higher Education Funding Council, ex p Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1 WLR 242; see also Oakley v South
Cambridgeshire District Council [2017] EWCA Civ 71.
75R (on the application of Hasan) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 2630 (Admin).
76Barnard v National Dock Labour Board [1953] 1 All ER 1113.
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deemed imminent for the purposes of the Act77 – in other words, there was sufficient time to seek
Commons approval – what may the courts have said? Lord Bingham stated in Belmarsh that there
should be strong deference to the Government’s assessment of the nature of threats posed to national
security because the executive are ‘called on to exercise a pre-eminently political judgment’.78
However, whilst previously the courts would have been happy with legal assurances by senior civil ser-
vants affirming the nature of threats,79 recent case law has suggested that the courts are now more
willing to challenge the deference that national security claims invite.80 What the Bill might have
added in such judicial assessments of national security, therefore, was their determination of ‘emer-
gency’ and ‘imminence’ (or ‘not sufficient time’ as it was couched in the Bill). Arguably, this would
have compelled the courts to determine the nature of a threat that would require a normative assess-
ment of whether the use of force was legal or not for the purposes of UK law. This would have her-
alded nothing short of a critical juncture in judicial review, by inviting domestic courts to rule on
deployment decisions. On the basis of this, it is arguable that the anxieties of opponents of the Bill
and the former Defence Secretary had some basis.
III. Reform as democratisation or as ‘use-of-force’ reduction?
If the aim or end of reforming the prerogative power had been use-of-force reduction, that the court
would have been able to pierce the veil of non-justiciability in deployment decisions ought to be wel-
comed as a positive development. This final section now deals with problematising the ‘rationale for
reform’, critiquing the primary driver behind the various efforts to change deployment decisions. To
recap, it is posited that democratisation of deployment decisions as the justification for statutorising
the war prerogative is partially misplaced. The basis of this claim asserts that making Parliament
involved in deployment decisions as the primary impulse for reform, though it will bring concomitant
positives such as subjecting deployment decisions to parliamentary scrutiny, may tend toward provid-
ing a legitimacy for deployment decisions that are not necessarily legal under UN Charter-based jus-
tifications under international law.
Interestingly, while the author of the Bill acknowledged the deaths of UK service women and men,
Baroness Margravine framed the reform of deployment decisions on the shortcomings with the cur-
rent constitutional arrangements – which no doubt there are – rather than the UK Government’s pre-
dilection to use force. In one respect, this is not surprising, as the main impulse for reform of the war
prerogative (and for the royal prerogative more generally) has been toward democratisation, transpar-
ency, accountability and scrutiny.81 There is very little discussion therefore, of any desire to limit the
use of force per se when it comes to the war prerogative. This ought to be surprising, particularly as the
Lords debate came just days after the bruising Iraq Inquiry82 which pointed to the litany of procedural
and policy errors in the build-up to the war, the execution of it, and reconstructive efforts in Iraq.
Discussions over the democratic control of the armed forces83 have been particularly prevalent
since the ascendancy of the Westphalian nation-state system. Indeed, there is a long lineage of
Enlightenment thought that examines and explores the proclivities of democratic societies going
to war. This has produced both advocates of the popular democratic peace theory as well as its
critics.84 The theory contends that democratic states are less predisposed to initiate or join in
wars, or are less likely to fight interstate wars – though qualifications have been made to the
77Clause 3(2)(b).
78A v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 48.
79Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v Minister for Civil Service, above n 65.
80A v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 48; R (on the application of Mohamed) v Foreign Secretary (No 2)
[2010] EWCA Civ 65.
81Public Administration Select Committee, above n 9, at 13–18.
82The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary (2016) HC 264.
83Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, website at http://dcaf.ch/ (last accessed 28 June 2018).
84S Rosato ‘The flawed logic of democratic peace theory’ (2003) 97(4) American Political Science Review 585.
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claim by suggesting that democracies are not overall less war prone, just less so with other demo-
cratic states. The idea has its origins, mistakenly according to some commentators,85 in
Immanuel Kant’s 1795 essay, Perpetual Peace, though Kant made the claim in reference to republics
with civil constitutions rather than democracies. Empirical studies have both supported86 and
refuted this claim87 but ‘democracy promotion’, as an extension of the democratic peace theory,
maintains considerable purchase in political discourse.
While it has been accepted that the use of force is a necessary evil in an international order of
nation-states, use-of-force reduction ought to be the primary impulse of reform of deployment deci-
sions. While it may appear that a Bill which subjects deployment decisions to parliamentary oversight
would reduce the use of force, this is not necessarily the case. Beside the 2013 vote on military inter-
vention in Syria (the coalition government’s motion being defeated by a slim majority of 13 votes),
Parliament has voted, in substantial majorities, for military intervention (Syria 2015, 397–223; Iraq
2014, 542–43; Libya 2011, 557–13; Iraq 2003, 412–149; Syria 2018 (ex post factum) 317–256).
Additionally, there is no conceptual connection between democratisation and use-of-force reduction.
In other words, greater legislative intervention in deployment decisions does not necessarily result
in use-of force reduction. Further, institutional and political restraints mean that MPs may not always
be able to vote freely. The conceptual and institutional-political restrains are now dealt with in turn.
Democratisation, it is argued, as the primary impulse may in fact result in more use-of-force by pro-
viding non-UN Charter-based justifications for deployment decisions with a patina of legitimacy (rather
than legality). Murray and O’Donoghue articulate why there is no conceptual connection between demo-
cratising ‘domestic use-of-force arrangements’ (as they refer to it) and the reduction of the use of force.
They argue that greater parliamentary involvement is actually being used to undermine the general pro-
hibition of the use of force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.88 Other states who incorporate
their democratic assemblies into deployment decisions often do so on the basis of UN Security Council
authorisation. This is not necessarily the case with UK parliamentary oversight of the use of force, par-
tially because of the dualist interaction between UK domestic and international law. Thus, the domestic
use of force arrangements can potentially supplant international legal prohibitions on the use of force,
rather than supplement it.89 The authors substantiate this claim with reference to the literature on the
legality-legitimacy distinction. This identifies a key shift in the normative basis of state action from ‘legal
decisions’ to ones that are ‘legitimate’ which are ‘a combination of legal, political and moral considera-
tions which do not necessarily align’.90 ‘Legitimate decisions’, therefore, are often couched in ‘legalised
language’, though they may not be predicated on UN Charter-based legal bases (or even weaker
non-Charter basis). Instead, they are legitimated by the approval of democratic assemblies. The authors
therefore identify an essential symbiosis between the reforms of the war prerogative (such as the conven-
tion to consult Parliament) and the novel grounds developed for military action. This can, in effect, pro-
duce parliamentary acceptance of non-Charter-based justifications for military force.91
On the institutional and political restraints, an important factor in supplanting UN Charter-based
deployment decisions with ‘legitimate deployment decisions’ is the control the UK Government has
over the Commons. The government can couch deployment decisions in ways that cast opponents
of its proposals as unpatriotic,92 make use of the whip on potential rebel backbenchers, frame the
vote as an expression of party loyalty, tie it to a vote of confidence in the Prime Minister93 or even
85JL Ray ‘Does democracy cause peace?’ (1998) 1 Annual Review of Political Science 28; S Gates et al ‘Democracy and
peace: a more skeptical view’ (1996) 33(1) Journal of Peace Research 6.
86R Rummel ‘Libertarianism and international violence’ (1983) 27(1) Journal of Conflict Resolution 27.
87Rosato, above n 84.
88Murray and O’Donoghue, above n 11.
89Murray and O’Donoghue, above n 11, at 307.
90Murray and O’Donoghue, above n 11, at 309.
91Murray and O’Donoghue, above n 11, at 311.
92Murray and O’Donoghue, above n 11, at 324.
93This was the case with the 2003 vote during Tony Blair’s premiership. See Strong, above n 18, at 614.
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attach it to careerist aspirations.94 Perhaps most importantly, however, there are also informational
limitations, whether necessary (on national security grounds) or strategic such that the
nature of commons debate precludes authoritative legal or security assessments, leaving parlia-
mentarians beholden to summaries of the advice enjoyed by the executive … in the final assess-
ment drawing upon national interest and moral considerations as well as issues of lawfulness,
MPs might therefore accept (as arguably some did in the context of Iraq) an action as legitimate
notwithstanding a breach of international law.95
While one should not presume that all parliamentarians are readily predisposed to military action
and unwilling to sacrifice party loyalty for their conscience, it is also important to accept that the
Commons have voted for military action, bar once, in overwhelming majorities on several occasions
since 2003. This is not necessarily to suggest that parliamentarians have little political agency, but
rather to recognise the power of the government in Commons. This was implicitly accepted in the
Iraq Inquiry when it acknowledged ‘a distinction between [Tony Blair’s] beliefs and the JIC’s actual
judgements’ over Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities in the representations made by
the former Prime Minister Tony Blair to Parliament on the 24 September 2002.96 Even if
Parliament’s role is strengthened, therefore, institutional and political restraints, specifically the
absence of comprehensive information (along with the control of government in the Commons)
means that decisions may be inchoate. Thus, the role of Parliament in deployment decisions, even
if a similar Bill were to pass, is hugely contingent on the good graces of the government which is
all the while trying to legitimate its use of force. Democratisation therefore, as an end of reform efforts,
underestimates the role of the government in Parliament and may merely ossify ‘inevitable’ legitim-
ation of government prerogative power.
Further, tenuous non-UN Charter-based and controversial Charter-based justifications – whether
they are expansive interpretations of Article 51 or controversial ‘revivals’ of old UN Security Council
Resolutions97 – could provide a quantitatively larger class of justifications to engage the emergency
conditions in such a type of Bill. The democratisation of the process for deployment, therefore, rather
than being an inhibition on a government power, could produce the opposite effect. If the goal is dem-
ocratisation, one cannot presume that this would necessarily result in use-of-force reduction.
Conclusion
The Armed Forces Deployment (Royal Prerogative) Bill was the most recent in a long line of Bills to
reform deployment decisions and part of a larger effort, beginning in 2003,98 by the Labour govern-
ment to reform the UK constitution. What the Bill allows us to envisage are the complexities of antici-
pating the multiple instantiations of ‘conflict decisions’ and to appreciate the latent problems in the
Prime Minister’s power to determine ‘emergency’ or ‘security’ exceptions to parliamentary approval
of deployment decisions. For the purposes of common law review, such a Bill, it has been argued,
would have warranted a radical departure from judicial deference to the executive. Importantly how-
ever, what it also highlighted is that there is no necessary connection between democratisation
(through parliamentary intervention) of the war prerogative and use-of-force reduction. On a concep-
tual level, this is because the value placed on democratising the deployment process is primarily only
of intrinsic value. The merits of parliamentary involvement on deployment decisions is ‘a good in and
of itself’ in legitimating governmental action. However, democratisation, it has been claimed, is of little
94Strong, above n 22, at 1136.
95Murray and O’Donoghue, above n 11, at 325.
96The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, above n 82.
97Woo, above n 1.
98See also Public Administration Select Committee, above n 9.
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instrumental value because the institutional and political restraints on parliamentarians under the
UK’s current constitutional arrangements are limiting – though of course parliamentarians have
often voted with their conscience rather than their party. For these reasons, legislative intervention,
while nobly subjecting such an important decision to parliamentary debate and approval, may do
qualitatively little to the aim of use-of-force reduction.
This normative basis, with such a Bill, for military action would be more interested in legitimacy –
through parliamentary involvement – rather than UN Charter-based legality. In addition, the ‘emergency
condition’ caveats could have been used to invoke tenuous legal justifications (non-Charter-based or
based on expansive but controversial readings of the Charter) for intervention without parliamentary
approval. A sole focus on democratisation in reform efforts as an end in itself, therefore, may actually
yield a more frequent use of force.
Parliamentary interventions on deployment decisions, therefore, will always struggle to reduce the
use of force. Use-of-force reduction can only be achieved, not through greater legislative intervention,
but through a more invasive common law review. By providing clear and precise standards, the paper
has begun to anticipate some of the ways in which judicial review could exercise a far greater super-
visory jurisdiction to provide a procedural and substantive check on government deployment deci-
sions. To that effect, this Bill, or similar Bills, may be useful. The perennial argument of this paper,
that ‘less use-of-force is better than more use-of-force’ can only effectively be addressed, therefore,
if the impulse for reform efforts is use-of-force reduction, rather than democratisation.
Cite this article: Chowdhury T (2018). Taming the UK’s war prerogative: the rationale for reform. Legal Studies 1–14. https://
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